Abstract
Introduction
In a recent supplement to the Journal of Medical Economics (JME), the case was put forward that if claims for the impact of products and devices on costs and outcomes in health care systems are to be accepted then they should meet the standards expected in 'normal science' 1 2 3 4 . The argument was made that if modeled or simulated claims are to be credible, practical and useful in formulary decisions then the only acceptable claims are those that are potentially falsifiable and replicable in a timeframe relevant to the needs of a formulary committee. If claims do not meet this standard they should be rejected.
The present review of cost-effectiveness studies published in Value in Health in the period January 2015 to December 2015 follows from two previous assessment of modeled or simulated cost-effectiveness studies published in PharmacoEconomics (PECON) and the JME in the same time period 5 6 . Both reviews concluded that the majority of studies published did not meet the standards of normal science. The studies were best characterized as thought experiments or imaginary worlds; as pseudoscience rather than science in putting to one side the construction of empirically evaluable theories and hypotheses. This is exemplified in the choice of cost-per-QALY endpoints. Apart from the fact that there is no accepted standard for a QALY metric, this is an immediate barrier to generating testable hypotheses as QALYs are not only not collected by health systems but no health system appears to be interested in collecting them 7 .
With the exception of a handful of single payer health care systems that have embraced the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) reference case, to include New Zealand (with the exceptions of cost-per-QALY thresholds) and Ireland, there seems little interest in adopting the reference case constructed model or simulation format to support pharmaceutical product decisions 8 9 10 11 . Mention should, however, be made of the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) Format for Formulary Submissions in the US, which recommends long-term models and simulations in chronic disease 12 . This Format, unfortunately, also fails to meet the standards of normal science 13 .
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Methods
A systematic review, following the PRISMA-P checklist (MeSH terms 'cost', 'cost effectiveness' , 'QALY') of all papers published in Value in Health in the period January 2015 to December 2015, identified 16 economic evaluation studies 14 . In order to judge whether the modeled claims presented met the standards of normal science four questions were considered:
• Is the model capable of generating testable claims?
• Did the author(s) attempt to generate testable claims? • Did the author(s) suggest how the claims might be evaluated? • Did the author(s) caution readers as to the implications of generating non-testable claims?
Each author independently reviewed the selected studies with consensus agreement reached on the assessment. A testable claim was defined as one that could be evaluated empirically in a timeframe relevant to the needs of a formulary committee (ideally a period of up to 2 to 3 years). This period was chosen because a testable claim was seen as provisional. A product or device could, in this context, be accepted by a formulary committee for formulary listing, but subject to an agreement with the manufacturer to report back to the committee with evidence to support the claims made. These claims could be for product comparative effectiveness, for the impact of the product on resource utilization or some combination of these to support a claim for incremental cost-effectiveness. The claim for comparative effectiveness could encompass clinical endpoints as well as those captured as patient reported outcomes.
In judging whether or not a model might support testable (falsifiable) claims, even if the possibility was not considered by the author(s), three characteristics of the model are important. These are (i) the modeling framework, (ii) the choice of primary outcome measure; and (iii) the time frame for the model. A Markov or discreet event simulation model with a lifetime perspective and with discounted cost per QALY claims as the primary endpoints would be one that would be impossible to evaluate. There is no chance of falsification, feedback to decision makers or replication. It would be assessed as immune to failure. Against this, a simple, trial-based decision model with a timeframe of 12 to 18 months with claims expressed in clinical (including PROs) and resource utilization endpoints would, given access to readily available data sources in the US, be open to hypothesis testing and feedback to a formulary committee.
The important point to note is that the modeled claim was not to be judged on the reasonableness or otherwise of the assumptions of the model. Certainly the model would be expected to cover comparator products, or least the key comparators, and to identify the target population for the claims. Beyond this, there was no attempt to evaluate whether or not the model necessarily complied with ISPOR recommended standards for good practice, although given that Value in Health subscribes to these standards, notably the CHEERS format, it was assumed that these criteria would have been addressed as part of the peer review process 15 . Table 1 summarizes the results of the review of the economic evaluation studies. Each paper is assessed under four headings:
Results
• Target • One paper presented the analysis as lives saved and costs 16 • One paper presented results as costs per major complication/death avoided 18 • Six papers were supported or funded by manufacturers and all modeled claims supported the manufacturers' product 19 25 28 29 30 31 Lifetime modeled cost per-QALY claims were not expected to generate evaluable claims. The only exception was the analysis by Carlson et al of the cost-effectiveness of tocilizumab versus adalimumab for patients with rheumatoid arthritis for whom methotrexate is inappropriate 29 . In this case a six month initiation phase was modeled as well as the patient's lifetime.
Of the 5 cost-per-QALY models that did not take a lifetime perspective, the timeframes varied from 2 to 7 years. There was no suggestion in any of these papers as to how testable claims might be generated by the model and how these claims might be evaluated in a treating environment. The same conclusions apply to the remaining two papers.
In respect of the four questions addressed above, the conclusions are: of the 16 economic evaluations presented in
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2015 by Value in Health, only 7 (at most) had the potential to develop testable claims, although none did so.
None of the economic evaluations addressed the issue of testable claims (and, of course, did not address the issue of how the claims might be evaluated and replicated) None of the evaluations cautioned readers as to the implications of generating non-testable claims as potential inputs to health care decisions
Discussion
Given the increased emphasis in the pharmacoeconomics literature on the potential role of QALYs as the preferred endpoint in cost-effectiveness claims, the fact that 14 of the 16 economic evaluations utilized a cost-per-QALY framework should come as no surprise. Possibly more surprising is the fact that 9 of these 14 papers used a lifetime cost-per-QALY framework. Perhaps this can put be down to standards (including mandated and recommended guidelines for formulary submissions) for modeling the 'natural' course of a chronic disease. Even so, the framework and endpoints adopted puts these studies in the category of pseudoscience. The reader is asked to take (or leave) these conclusions at face value. It is unclear how these claims could be factored into formulary decisions if the recipient raised the issues of assessment and replication.
Overall, however, the most interesting question that emerges from this review is the fact that none of the evaluations raised any concerns as to what is best described as the imaginary nature of the models presented. There is no attempt to address the issue of sufficient correspondence in constructing the model or simulation in generating predictive claims. Instead, the reader is asked to take the inherent reasonableness of the simulation or model at face value. With due regard to the limitations pointed to in these evaluations, the claims for cost-effectiveness, for the probable superiority of one product or course of treatment over another, the authors clearly believe that their models should be taken seriously as a quantitative contribution to informing health decision makers.
This does not mean that, at least for a few of the evaluations presented, there is not the potential to generate testable predictions. The Vertuani et al study, for example, points out that QALYs as a measure of effectiveness may not fully represent the patient's perspective 17 . The authors note that as the QALYs were EQ-5D based, relatively small differences in pain may not be fully captured. In addition, the full treatment pathway after surgical complications was not modeled due to the absence of data, nor was there data to capture post-operative work loss. Even so, in focusing on a two year timeframe, it would have been possible to generate modeled claims and to propose how these might be validated in treatment settings, possibly including complementary measures of HRQoL as well as claims for resource utilization, reduction in length of hospital stay, reduced blood loss and fewer complications. This was not attempted.
Another cost-per-QALY study that had the potential to generate testable claims over the short-term, is the Nguyen et al model of treatment resistant depression interventions 19 . The 3-year Markov model yields the unequivocal claim that rTMS dominated pharmacotherapy for patients with treatment resistant depression, generating (admittedly minimal) QALYs gained (1.25 vs. 1.18) but at a slightly lower cost with the 73% probability, at a threshold of A$50,000, that it is cost-effective. Given this it would surely have been possible to propose an assessment protocol that would have tested these claims, with possibility that with such minimal benefits and cost savings the claim for cost-effectiveness may have been overturned. The Legrand study, although based on an acute model of hemodynamic monitoring and fluid therapy strategies gave no indication of how this might be translated to evaluate claims for cost and clinical outcomes such as hospital mortality and major complications 18 .
Unfortunately, from the perspective (as discussed in detail below) of normal science, the preference for lifetime costper-QALY models in 9 of the 16 papers points to the acceptance of a methodology that, while conforming to ISPOR recommended standards, is at odds with that of normal science. The models and claims are immune to failure and, as such, if these standards are accepted, should be put to one side. 19 
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There has been increasing concern expressed in the last few years over the presence of repetitive flaws and the need for guidelines to improve experimental reproducibility. This applies equally well to simulations and models in pharmacoeconomics. As noted in a recent editorial in Nature, applicants to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are now required 'to explain the scientific premise behind their proposals and defend the quality of their experimental design' 16 . More recently, Camerer et al in their evaluation of laboratory experiments in economics find, of the 18 studies considered, an effect size in the same direction in only 11 replications with on average a replicated effect size of 66% of the original 17 . As the authors point out 'the deepest trust in scientific knowledge comes from the ability to replicate empirical findings', although rarely carried out in the social sciences.
Informing Decision Makers
If these models and their claims are intended to inform decision makers, as presumably is the case for those sponsored by manufacturers, then the effort is probably wasted. In each case we could, presumably, engage other research groups to develop competing models and come up with competing claims. This possibility was recognized over 20 years ago by the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) when the journal set out, in an Editorial, its policy on costeffectiveness studies 18 . The case put forward was that because of the discretionary nature of cost-effectiveness methods it was incumbent upon authors, journal editors and funders of such studies to minimize any source of bias. In consequence, the policy of the NEJM on publication was (and remains) not only to ask for an author's financial connections with a company, but to reject for consideration any article, to include reviews and editorials, in which an author has a personal financial conflict of interest. In the present case, as noted above, 6 of the 16 papers had funding or other support from the manufacturer whose product, on the modeled assessment, was claimed to be cost-effective.
There is, however, a more substantive reason than the potential for bias for journals such as the NEJM to establish standards in accepting cost-effectiveness studies: the fact that simulated or modeled claims for cost-effectiveness, unless they generate testable hypotheses and meet the standards for normal science are simply imaginary worlds or thought experiments. As discussed below: simulations, even if there is a claim for similarity, are not experiments. Unless there is the ability to generate testable claims (and repeatedly test those claims) and provide guidance as to how these claims could be assessed, the cost-effectiveness analysis lacks credibility. The analysis may be aimed at informing and influencing decision makers but there is no way of judging whether the information provided is relevant to decision making. The claim may be quite misleading, indeed harmful, although we have no idea as to how misleading it might be.
Testable Hypotheses
The requirement for testable hypotheses in product and device impacts is unexceptional. Since the 17 th century it has been accepted that if a research agenda is to advance, if there is to be an accretion of knowledge and if models are to generate meaningful hypotheses, then these hypotheses must be such that they can be empirically evaluated. This position is made abundantly clear by Wootton in his reassessment of the use of language in the idea of the scientific revolution in In the early 20 th century standards for empirical assessment were put on a sound methodological basis by Popper in his advocacy of a process of 'conjecture and refutation' 21 22 .
Hypotheses or claims must be capable of falsification; indeed they should be framed in such a way that makes falsification likely. Life becomes more interesting if claims are falsified because this forces us to reconsider our models and the assumptions built into those models. To the extent that the proponents of the pharmacoeconomic modeled claim believe that it can be defended on the grounds that it 'reflects reality' or is a 'reasonable representation' of what is 'out there' (whatever those terms actually mean), it is worth reflecting on Popper's statement: 'never in science are inferences drawn from mere observational experience to the prediction of future events' 23 . The fundamental issue is one of demarcation: to distinguish science (e.g., natural selection) from pseudoscience (e.g., intelligent design).
Standards in Pharmacoeconomics
It is curious that in the standards proposed by the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) there is no mention of the need to meet the standards of normal, experimental science in respect of (i) falsification and (ii) replication. Certainly predictive validation (rather than falsification) is mentioned, but it is considered as more of an optional (and even preferred) extra to other recommended forms of model validation. The possibility of committing to an ongoing process of replication and assessing the presence of false positives is entirely absent. A reasonable question to ask is why this has this occurred?
Looking back over the past 20 years there are literally hundreds (if not thousands) of published simulated and modeled claims that fail to meet the standards of normal science. A reviewer might then reasonably ask how did this situation arise? Is it an accident? Do we assume that those accepting these standards (and the number of ISPOR standards that support such models) were simply unaware of the standards of normal science? Or is there an implicit (if not explicit) acceptance that in pharmacoeconomics different standards should apply? Is there a research program, as it would be understood in the physical sciences, that underpins pharmacoeconomic studies? Or is pharmacoeconomics willing to continue to support the creation of imaginary worlds with studies that are immune to falsification?
A curious feature of the pharmacoeconomics literature is the apparent absence, after some 30 years, of successor studies that have attempted to evaluate claims put forward in published modeled claims. Unlike disciplines like physics where there is an ongoing appraisal of claims and an accumulation of theoretical and empirical knowledge generated by practitioner's ability to develop practical and useful models, pharmacoeconomics is silent.
From the late 1980s when attention began to be given to the applications of decision modeling to clinical decision making, the role of decision models was seen as 'informing' health care decision makers. It was not clear, however, as to what form this provision of information should take and the standards by which this evidence should be judged. Weinstein and Fineberg in their seminal textbook on decision analysis argue that decision analysis 'offers a prescriptive model for clinical decision making ….an aid, not a substitute for clinical reasoning' 24 . More recently Drummond et al in the 3 rd edition of their text on economic evaluation see the 'ultimate purpose of economic evaluation is …to inform different types of decision makers about the efficient allocation of health care resources' with the 'greatest use of these methods is to inform particular decisions in specific jurisdictions providing the means of bringing evidence from a range of sources together… and providing a framework for decision-making under uncertainty' 25 . Unfortunately, if 'information' as an aid to decision making is presented either in the form of untestable hypotheses or where it is immune to falsification (and replication) it is difficult to see whether a decision maker should take the evidence presented seriously.
Truth is Consensus
But we do not have to subscribe to the standards of normal science; pharmacoeconomics is perfectly within its rights to adopt a relativist position where all perspectives are equally valid. Indeed, support for a relativist position is widespread, at least outside of the natural sciences. Following from the publication of Philosophical Investigation by Wittgenstein, and the view that truth is merely consensus, the emergence of the so-called Science and Technology Studies in the 1960s in the UK, as described by Wootton, in their advocacy of the equivalence principle saw a widespread acceptance of the relativist position 26 24 . Applying the principle of symmetry, for relativists the content of science is to be understood sociologically. Relativists reject the notion that one body of evidence is superior to another. We cannot adopt the viewpoint of one community and reject another. As Wootton summarizes the relativist position: The success of a scientific research programme thus depends not on its ability to generate new knowledge but on its ability to mobilize the support of a community 24 . In this community research program evidence is always constructed; it is never discovered. Rather than attempting to come to grips with reality, science is about rhetoric, persuasion and authority.
The embrace of a relativist position in pharmacoeconomics sets the stage for the acceptance of simulations to construct new evidence. Truth is constructed. Hypothesis testing and replication are redundant. Even, presumably, if the predictions relate to the lifetime discounted cost-per-QALY outcomes of a target chronic disease population. We put to one side the possibility that simulations can fail and accept that any simulation is 'doomed to succeed' 27 .
If decision makers are prepared to accept the relativist position then, presumably, this is the end of the story. Journals will continue to publish claims that are non-testable and immune to falsification, claims that are factored into formulary and pricing decisions. It is difficult to believe that this position is acceptable. It is difficult to take seriously a consensus belief that models and simulations are sufficiently representative of a target reality.
An imaginary world yields imaginary claims. A consideration that needs to be kept in mind when a simulated or modeled claim is published that is sponsored by and which favors a manufacturer's product or if recommendations are made by independent assessors. If a claim is immune to falsification then decisions for formulary listing, discounted or premium
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pricing are open to challenge. A formulary committee cannot point to evidence, other than the constructed evidence of a simulation, to support their decision. Indeed, it is all too easy, given the inherent flexibility allowed in constructing imaginary worlds, for competitors to present contradictory claims. How could this existential threat be handled within a relativist paradigm? With two imaginary worlds competing for attention, both with untestable competing claims, there is no basis for a resolution. The protagonists could argue over modeling techniques, over assumptions and over thresholds -a debate that is unlikely to lead anywhere. Even if ISPOR or some other organization took it upon itself the task of 'simulation adjudication' it would seem a pointless exercise when testable short-term modeled competing claims could be readily adjudicated by an appeal to the facts: to falsification and replication.
Attempts in the US attempts to assess comparative QALY product performance has, more by accident than an appeal to the standards of normal science, met resistance with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010). The act forbids the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to use cost-per-QALY "or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual's disability as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended". The fact that there appears to be little interest, in any case, by health care systems in the US in claims expressed in terms of QALYs, is a further positive feature. Indeed, from a global perspective, the US is not alone in failing to put procedures in place to collect QALYs on a regular basis -even if a QALY standard could be agreed as a common metric across health care systems. Even in the UK, where the reference case is the assessment standard, the fact is that no health authority collects QALYs. Given the absence of any acceptance and implementation of a QALY metric, the emphasis on QALY modeled claims seems even more difficult to defend.
Conclusions
Unfortunately, practitioners, journal editors and groups such as ISPOR do not have the luxury of putting the question of scientific credibility to one side. It may be a difficult decision to make particularly when it is pointed out that there are (and have been) substantial commitments made by manufacturers and others to supporting cost-effectiveness studies which in retrospect generate claims that are immune to failure. If we consider the resources manufacturers have devoted internally in staffing health technology assessment groups and to supporting consultant activities, the question may reasonably be asked as to what benefits have been derived from these activities and, for the future, what benefits might be expected if there are concerns as to the robustness and credibility of these activities? Should they continue to accept that decisions in medicine can be based on modeled or simulated claims that are untestable and which fail to meet the standards of normal science?
What are the options open to ISPOR, Value in Health and to practitioners in pharmacoeconomics if they are to avoid the charge that all too often modeled claims lack credibility and fail to provide an input to health decision makers that is practical and useful? An important step would be to acknowledge that, for the past 25 years, those advocating standards and good practice for modeled claims have failed to consider the need to meet the standards of normal science. This may be a difficult decision to take; after all, to admit that literally dozens if not hundreds of published studies lack credibility and should be put to one side is not an easy decision. The next important step would be to reconsider the standards for 'good' modeling or simulation and ensure that these recognize the essential place of falsification and replication. The Editor of Value in Health could request that when authors submit simulations or models that lack testable claims that they state explicitly that the study does not meet the standards of normal science. Authors should state (i) that the claims are not open to (a) falsification and (b) replication and (ii) that in the absence of experimentation the claims may be right but also that they may be wrong. Hypothetical 3-year health state transition (Markov) model with key outcome incremental cost per QALY, the additional cost of rTMS over additional QALY compared to antidepressants; both discounted at 5%. QALYs gained were greater with rTMS while costs were slightly lower. At a threshold of A$50,000 per QALY the probability that rTMS was dominant was 32% and likelihood it was cost-effective was 41%. Resources and costs were standardized to meet constraints of Markov cycle. Cost-effectiveness of TCZ versus ADA assessed over two time horizons: The treatment initiation phase of 6 months and the patient lifetime. The latter timeframe utilized a patient level simulation model to estimate incremental cost per QALY. EQ-5D scores were mapped from the HAQ scores. One-way and probabilistic sensitivity simulation was used to capture uncertainty. In the 6 month model TCZ cost more than ADA with the ICER ranging from $6,570 per additional achievement of LDAS to $14,265 per additional ACR70 response. In the lifetime model, the incremental QALY gain of 0.04 life years and 0.23 QALYs while increasing cost by $8,532. This produced an ICER of $36,944/QALY for TCZ compared to ADA. The results of the probabilistic sensitivity analysis demonstrated that there is more than 50% probability that TCZ is cost-effective compared to ADA mono if threshold is $40,000/QALY. The probability that TCZ is While there is a potential for generating evaluable claims from the 6 month model, this was not explored. As a lifetime cost-per-QALY model, the claims are impossible to evaluate. There is no guidance for possible evaluation, and provision of feedback for treatment centers.
cost-effective compared to ADA is 100% at all levels of willingness to pay. The authors concluded that ADA is cost-effective in this patient group. TCZ is the sponsor's product. 
